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depending upon transactions antecedent to the void deed. However, the
rationale of Wright 49 was categorically rejected in the present case.
Third, the decision suggests that a void or forged deed itself could not
be a root of title. The instant court by reference to Professor Barnett's
article adopted the view that if a forged deed were the root of title or
subsequent to the root of title, then the interest of the grantor whose name
was forged would not be extinguished by the Act. 50 This view would control
although the grantor's interest "'depends upon [a] . . . transaction . . .

that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title.' "5
The key to marketable title acts is understanding the "root of title"
concept. The instant case has further clarified Florida's interpretation of the
root of title by correctly reasoning that a forged or void deed cannot be
a root of title. Significantly, the principal case indicates that the Act can
validate a record chain of title even though such title is based on a void
deed antecedent to the root of title. As exhibited in the present case, the
courts must exercise restraint in enacting exceptions if the Florida Marketable
Record Title Act is to remain viable. However, the ultimate success of the
Act depends upon the extent to which the practicing bar relies on it.
RICHARD

H.

POWELL

TAXATION: DEDUCTIBILITY OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS BY
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United States
304 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
Plaintiff taxpayer, a federally chartered savings and loan association,
sought to recover additional premium payments that it claimed were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses in the year of payment.,
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had disallowed any deduction for these
compulsory insurance premiums paid to the secondary reserve of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The Government argued
that the payments were capital in nature because the unused premiums could
be returned to the taxpayer, but the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida HELD, additional premiums are deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense regardless of the possibility that all
or part of said premiums may be recovered by the taxpayer.

49. Wright held that FLA. STAT. §95.23 (1967) did not apply to a deed that was void by
reason of forgery of the grantor's name.

50. 224 So. 2d 743, 751 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
51. Id.
1.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §162 (a).
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Federal savings and loan associations are required to make "regular"
premium payments2 to the primary reserve and "additional" premium payments3 to the secondary reserve of the FSLIC. The regular premiums purchase insurance coverage for the year of payment, are nonrecoverable, and
are properly deductible. In 1962 Congress added the additional premium
requirement to increase the reserve funds of the FSLIC to a level capable
of sustaining emergency losses.4 The additional premiums are credited to
each institution's separate account in the secondary reserve5 and earn interest
at the current rate for government obligations.0 Contingent upon the depletion of the secondary reserve from institutional failures, amounts credited
to the taxpayer's secondary reserve account may be refunded to the taxpayer
in cash 7 or used to discharge the taxpayer's obligation to pay regular premiums to the primary reserve. 8 Thus, the additional premiums are considered
"in the nature of a prepayment with respect to future premiums."9
Only two other cases have reached the issue of the instant case. First
FederalSavings and Loan Association of St. Joseph v. United States'0 decided
in favor of deductibility, while the second case, Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association v. Commissioner" accepted the Government's position that "the
additional premium prepayments ... are not deductible when paid and may
be deducted only when any possibility of their return is precluded."' 2 The
2. 12 US.C. §1727 (b) (1) (1964) provides that the regular premiums be in the amount
of 1/12 of 1% of the accounts and creditor obligations.
3. 12 U.S.C. §1727 (d) (1964) provides that additional premiums be in the amount of
2% of the net account increase of each association, less an amount equal to any requirement
to purchase stock of the Federal Home Loan Bank.
4. Id. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Mo.

1968).
5. 12 U.S.C. §1727 (e) (1964).
6.

Id.

7. 12 U.S.C. §1727 (f) (1964) provides for a refund if "(i) the status of an insured institution as an insured institution is terminated . . . (ii) a conservator, receiver or other
legal custodian is appointed for an insured institution . . . or (iii) the Corporaton [FSLIC]
makes a determination that for the purposes of this subsection an insured institution has
gone into liquidation .... ." 12 U.S.C. §1727(g) (1964) provides for a refund if "the
Primary Reserve equals or exceeds such two per centum [of accounts and creditor obligations], the Corporation shall . . . pay in cash to each insured institution its pro rata
share of the Secondary Reserve and shall not, after such time, accept or receive further
prepayments [additional premiums] .... "
8. 12 U.S.C. §1727 (g) (1964) provides for the cessation of the obligation to make additional premiums when "the aggregate of the Primary Reserve and the Secondary Reserve
equals or exceeds 2 per centum of the total amount of all accounts of insured members and
creditor obligations of all insured institutions but the Primary Reserve does not equal or
exceed such 2 per centum . . . each insured institution's pro rata share of the Secondary
Reserve shall be used to the extent available, to discharge such institution's obligation for
its [regular premiums] ....
The obligation to make additional premiums resumes when
the aggregate of the two reserves falls to "13K per centum of the total amount of all accounts of insured members and creditor obligations of all insured institutions .
9. 12 U.S.C. §1727(d) (1964).
10. 288 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
11. 51 T.C. 82, [1968 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. R i. 229,196 (1968).
12. Rev. Rul. 66-49, 1966-1 CuOM. BULL. 36.
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basic arguments adopted by the Tax Court in Lincoln, and rejected in the
present case, were: (1) additional premiums are not spent for insurance
coverage in the year of payment because they are not ordinarily available
against losses; (2) additional premiums are a capital expenditure because
of the reversionary interest retained by the taxpayer; and (3) expectancy of
a taxpayer's recovery is very high considering past loss statistics and reasonable predictions by the Office of the Comptroller of dates of recovery.' 3
The Internal Revenue Service allows insurance premiums as ordinary
and necessary business expense deductions in the year of coverage. 14 In
Lincoln the IRS disputed the contention that additional premiums provided
insurance coverage by emphasizing their qualitatively different treatment by
the FSLIC. Unlike regular premiums, additional premiums are not income
to the FSLIC and are not ordinarily available to meet the FSLIC's annual
expenses and losses. Furthermore, since they are credited to separate, interest
bearing accounts, additional premiums retain their distinctive ownership
characteristics. St. Joseph and the instant case both held that the purpose in
paying each premium, the compulsion to pay each, and the consequences
for failure to pay were identical for both types of premium.- The present
case also held that both reserves are subject to depletion to cover losses from
institutional failures. 6 The possibility of recovery was the only recognized
difference between additional and regular premiums. This contingent possibility was deemed to "lie in the realm of pure speculation,' ' 1 and the court
relied on the principle that a mere possibility of return should not prohibit
an otherwise proper deduction. 8 The Tax Court in Lincoln had criticized
this approach, contending that it overlooked the requirement that the expenditure first be proved an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Secondly, the Government argued that the payment of the additional
premiums created a capital asset. A capital asset has a useful life extending
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year. 19 A capital expenditure,
by its very nature, is not deductible as a business expense.2 0 Because a capital
expenditure does not reduce the assets of a taxpayer, a deduction would not
comply with the tax principle that the taxpayer's method of reporting income
should accurately reflect the net results for that particular year.21 When a
taxpayer deducts from gross income an amount that is not clearly an expense

13. H.R. Rep. No. 823, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
14. Treas. Reg. §1.162-1 (1958).
15. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (S.D.
Fla. 1969).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "[Ain otherwise proper deduction should not be disallowed in the year in which it
is paid or incurred because of the existence of a possibility that at some future date the
taxpayer might receive a reimbursement therefor [sic]." Electric Tachometer Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 158, 161 (1961).
19.

See 4A

J.

MFRTENs, LAW or FEDERAL INCOME

TAXATION

§25.20 (1966).

20. Id.
21. Appeal of J. Alland & Bro., Inc., I B.T.A. 631, 633 (1925).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 10

1970]

CASE COMMENTS

properly chargeable against the gross income of that year, "it is incumbent
upon the taxpayer to show that it is at least within the letter of the provision of the law permitting the deduction." 22 In the instant case, the court
held that a capital asset connotes retention of power and control over its
recovery and concluded that the taxpayer, lacking this power and control,
did not acquire a capital asset.23 The court believed the premiums were
"within the letter of the provision permitting the deduction" 24 of ordinary
and necessary business expenses because the premiums provided insurance
2
coverage and therefore were not capital expenditures. 5
The Tax Court in Lincoln, however, compared additional premiums
to the requirement that associations purchase Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) stock. 26 Both requirements create the same compulsion to pay and
lack of control over recovery. The argument adopted in the instant case that
additional premiums are subject to total depletion while associations are
guaranteed recovery of FHLB stock contributions was countered in Lincoln
with the statement that additional premium payments "will definitely" be
2
used to discharge future premiums. 7
The IRS considered this analogy conclusive in showing the capital
nature of additional premiums. However, while stock is usually considered
a capital asset, this is not an unexcepted rule. Required acquisition of
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) stock by businesses dealing
with the FNMA has been held deductible to the extent that the purchase
price exceeds fair market value because it was "proper and necessary in the
furtherance of such business and the securities were not acquired for investment purposes." 28 However, the Tax Court emphasized that fair market
value of the stock--was, consistently around fifty per cent of par value. 29 In
addition, voluntary purchases of a company's stock in order to secure a
right to purchase some of its inventory when other markets are exhausted
30
is an ordinary, necessary, and deductible expense.
These differences regarding whether additional premiums buy insurance
coverage or are a capital asset stem from diverging opinions on the likelihood
of their return to the associations without depletion to cover losses. The
IRS, in its third contention, relied on past statistics that indicated losses
had been so minimal that the secondary reserve had never been used to cover
them.31 The Tax Court in Lincoln also noted that such depletion seemed
22.

Id.

23. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (S.D.
Fla. 1969).
24. Appeal of J. Alland &Bro., Inc., 1 B.T.A. 631, 683 (1925).
25. INT. Riay.

CODE

of 1954, §162 (a).

26. 12 U.S.C. §1426 (c) (1) (1964).
27. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 82, [1968 Transfer Binder]
CCH TAX CT. REP. 129,196, at 2938 (1968).
28. McMillan Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 924, 932 (1961).
29. Id. at 929.
30. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146 (1955); Western Wine
& Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1090 (1952).
81. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 82, [1968 Transfer Binder] CCH
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unlikely in light of predictions by the Comptroller that the aggregate of the
two reserves would be such by 1970 that the secondary reserve would be used
to fulfill associations' obligations to pay regular premiums?2 To show the
uncertainty of recovery, the instant court emphasized the refusal of the
General Accounting Office to "express an opinion as to the adequacy of the
insurance fund reserve to meet future losses."-3 3 The court agreed with the
taxpayer that the contingency of recovery was remote and purely speculative. 3Courts have had difficulty in consistently determining the proper time
to deduct prepaid expenses while maintaining the integrity of the taxable
year. Even prepaid insurance premiums covering a number of years were
the subject of such controversy before proration became the rule.35 Prepaid

interest is usually not deductible in the year of payment if paid more than
twelve months before it accrues. 3 Exceptions have included the allowance
of a deduction for a prepayment of five year's interest.37 However, prepayment of the last year's rent under a lease requiring such prepayment is
8
held deductible only in the year in which such rent is applicable.
WAith reference to deductibility, additional premiums are more analogous
to payments having a contingent possibility of return than to prepaid
expenses. Payments pursuant to reimbursement agreements are similar to
loans or advances and are not deductible as business expenses.3 9 When the
4
possibility of reimbursement is less certain, courts take divergent views. "

The majority of courts emphasize expectation of recovery, disallowing deductions for payments when there is reasonable certainty of recovery or reim-

V29,176, at 2930 n.2 (1968). "The FSLIC, during the 27 years of its existence
prior to June 30, 1961, had incurred net insurance losses of only $5.1 million, approximately
1.1 percent of its cumulative gross income." Id.
32. Id. at 2931.
33. Washington Fed. Say. 9, Loan Ass'n v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (S.D.
Fla. 1969).
34. Id.
35. Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942); G.C.M.
23587, 1943 CuA. BULL. 213. Proration was the initial rule, G.C.M. 13148, XIII-1 Cum. BULL.
67 (1934), but was not accepted by the First Circuit. Welch v. DeBlois, 94 F.2d 842 (1st Cir.
1938). After the Treasury accepted the Welch decision, G.C.M. 20307, 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 157,
the First Circuit reversed itself and reinstated proration as the rule. Commissioner v.
Boylston Market Ass'n, supra. But see Waldheim Realty & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 245
F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
36. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cuss. BULL. 76.
37. Konigsberg v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. 48 (1946); Fackler v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A.
395 (1939).
38. Smith v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 429 (1968); University Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 416, 421 (1966), afl'd, 378 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1967).
39. Electric Tachometer Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 158 (1961); Drachman v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 558 (1954); Glendinning, McLeish & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d
950 (2d Cir. 1932).
40. Burnet v. Hutchinson Coal Co., 64 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1933); Albright v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1228 (1929); cf. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
TAX CT. REP.
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bursement.41 The court in Burnet v. Hutchinson Coal Co.4 2 held that when
recovery is uncertain, the payment "should be treated as an expense for the
particular year in which it is paid." 43 However, the Court of Claims has
sustained deductions of payments that probably will be recovered, 4 and the
IRS has stated that premiums to a mutual insurance company are deductible
when paid, although a portion of the premium is likely to be returned.45
The IRS also allows deduction of a payment of contested liability notwithstanding the possibility of future recovery of all or part of the payment.46
In the area of guaranty funds insuring state banks, to which the FSLIC
41
system is analogous, the Government has taken an inconsistent approach.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the earlier Board of Tax
Appeals' position by holding these guaranty payments, which are recoverable
upon contingencies similar to those under the federal plan, nondeductible
because of the definiteness of future recovery. 48 The present case distinguished the Fifth Circuit case in that withdrawal from the guaranty fund
and adoption of an alternative bond protection plan cause a prorata share
of the fund to be returned to the taxpayer.
Federal savings and loan associations have no power to voluntarily
recover, assign, or transfer their additional premiums without liquidating their
insured status. 49 The IRS asserts that an association can deduct the additional
premiums only in the year when they are used to pay regular premium
obligations, and this only after the aggregate of the two reserves has reached
two per cent of all accounts and creditor obligations. 50 The Tax Court
agreed with the IRS that the secondary reserve is unlikely to ever be
depleted, and contended that this reserve "will definitely" be used to pay
regular premium obligations in future years and therefore eventually will be
deductible.51

41. Drachman v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 558 (1954); Burnet v. Hutchinson Coal Co.,
64 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1933).
42. 64 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1933).
43. Id. at 278.

44. RCA Communications, Inc. v. United States, 277 F.2d 164 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Pittsburgh
Industrial Engineering, 9 T.C.M. 1132 (1950).
45. G.C.M. 10798, XI-2 Cum. BULL. 58 (1932); I.T. 2646, XI-2 Cum. BULL. 59 (1932).
46. Treas. Reg. §1.451-2 (1964).
47. The IRS first held the premiums deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, I.T. 1258, I-1 Cum. BuLL. 281 (1922), but revoked this in I.T. 2208, IV-2 Cum.
Bum. 81 (1925). However, the Board of Tax Appeals rejected this approach and held
the premiums deductible because they were paid "pursuant to a definite liability fixed by
law." First State Bank v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 975, 980 (1927). The IRS changed its
position to conform to the Board of Tax Appeals. G.C.M. 8474, IX-2 Cum. BuLL.281 (1930).
The IRS then modified G.C.M. 8474 in G.C.M. 13290, XIII-2 Cum. BuLL. 318 (1934), pursuant to the holding of nondeductibility in Wichita State Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
69 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1934).
48. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1934).
49. 12 U.S.C. §§1727 (f) (i)- (iii) (1964).
50. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 82, [1968 Transfer Binder] CCH
TAx CT. REP. 1129,196, at 2939 (1968).
51. Id.
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